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In November 1988 a worm program invaded several thousand UNIX.operated Sun workstations and
VAX computers attached to the Research Internet, seriously disrupting service for several days but
damaging no files. An analysis of the worm's decompiled code revealed a battery of attacks by a
knowledgeable insider, and demonstrated a number of security weaknesses. The attack occurred in
an open network, and little can be inferred about the vulnerabilities of closed networks used for criti-
cal operations. The attack showed that password protection procedures need review and strengthen-
ing. It showed that sets of mutually trusting computers need to be carefully controlled. Sharp public
reaction crystalized into a demand for user awareness and accountability in a networked world.
This is a preprint of the column The Science of Computing for
American Scientist 77, No. 2 (March-April 1989).
Work reported herein was supported in part by Cooperative Agreement NCC 2-387
between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
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Late in the evening of 2 November 1988 someone released a "worm" program into
the ARPAnet. The program expropriated the resources of each invaded computer and
generated replicas of itself on Other computers, but did no apparent damage. Within
hours, it had spread to several thousand computers attached to the worldwide Research
Intemet.
Computers infested with the worm were soon laboring under a huge load of pro-
grams that looked like innocuous "shell" programs (command interpreters). Attempts to
kill these programs were ineffective: new copies would appear from Internet connections
as fast as old copies were deleted. Many systems had to be shut down and the security
loopholes closed before they could be restarted on the network without reinfestation.
Fortuitously, the annual meeting of UNIX experts opened at Berkeley on the morn-
ing of November 3. They quickly went to work to capture and dissect the worm. By that
evening, they had distributed system fixes to close all the security loopholes used by the
worm to infest new systems. By the rooming of November 4, teams at MIT, Berkeley,
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and other institutions had decompiled the worm code and examined the worm's structure
in the programming language C. They were able to confirm that the worm did not delete
or modify files already in a computer. It did not install Trojan horses, exploit superuser
privileges, or transmit passwords it had deciphered. It propagated only by the network
protocols TCP/IP, and it infested only computers running Berkeley UNIX but not AT&T
System V UNIX. As the community of users breathed a collective sigh of relief, system
administrators installed the fixes, purged all copies of the worm, and restarted the
downed systems. Most hosts were reconnected to the Intemet by November 6, but the
worm's effect lingered: a few hosts were will disconnected as late as November 10, and
mail backlogs did not clear until November 12.
The worm's fast and massive infestation was so portentous that the New York Times
ran updates on page one for a week. The Wall Street Journal and USA Today gave it
front-page Coverage. It was the subject of two articles in Science magazine (I,2). It was
covered by the wire services, the news shows, and the talk shows. These accounts said
that over 6,000 computers were infested, but later estimates put the actual number
between 3,000 and 4,000, about 5% of those attached to the Intemet.
On November 5 the New York Times broke the story that the alleged culprit was
Robert T. Morris, a ComeU graduate student and son of a well-known computer security
expert who is the chief scientist at the National Computer Security Center. A if!end
reportedly said that Morris intended no disruption; the worm was supposed to propagate
slowly but a design error made it unexpectedly prolific. When he realized what was hap-
pening, Morris has a friend post on an electronic bulletin board instructions telling how
to disable the worm -- but no one could access them because all affected computers were
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down. As of February1989,no indictments had been filed against Morris as authorities
pondered legal questions. Morris himself was silent throughout.
The worm's author went to great lengths to confound its discovery and analysis, a
delaying tactic that permitted the massive infestation. By early December 1988, Eugene
Spafford of Purdue (3), Donn Seeley of Utah (4), and Mark Eichin and Jon Rochlis of
MIT (5) had published technical reports about the decompiled worm that described the
modes of infestation and the methods of camouflage. (See Box 1.) They were impressed
with the worm's battery of attacks, saying that, despite errors in the source program, the
code was competently done. The National Computer Security Center requested them and
others not to publish the decompiled code, fearing that troublemakers might reuse the
code and modify it for destructive acts. Seeley replied that the question is moot because
the worm published itself in thousands of computers.
The reactions of the computer science community have been passionate. Some edi-
torial writers report that Morris has become a folk hero among students and program-
mers, who believe that the community ought to be grateful that he showed us weaknesses
in our computer networks in time to correct them before someone launches a malicious
attack. The great majority of opinion, however, seems to go the other way. Various
organizations have issued position statements decrying the incident and calling for action
to prevent its recurrence. No other recent break-in has provoked similar outcries.
The organization Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility issued a state-
ment calling the release of the worm an irresponsible act and declaring that no program-
mer can guarantee that a self-replicating program will have no unwanted consequences.
The statement said that experiments to demonstrate network vulnerabilities should be
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done under controlled conditions with prior permission, and it called for codes of ethics
that recognize the shared needs of network users. Finally, the statement criticized the
National Computer Security Center's attempts to block publication of the decompiled
worm code as short-sighted because an effective way to correct widespread security
flaws is to publish descriptions of those flaws widely.
The boards of directors of the CSNET and BITNET networks issued a joint state-
ment deploring the irresponsibility of the worm's author and the disruption in the
research community caused by the incident. Their statement called for a committee that
would issue a code of network ethics and propose enforcement procedures. It also called
for more attention to ethics in university curricula. (At Stanford, Helen Nissenbaum and
Terry Winograd have already initiated a seminar that will examine just such questions.)
The advisory panel for the division of networking and research infrastructure at
NSF endorsed the CSNET/BITNET statement, citing as unethical any disruption of the
intended use of networks, wasting of resources through disruption, destruction of
computer-based information, compromising of privacy, or actions that make necessary an
unplanned consumption of resources for control and eradication. The Intemet Activities
Board has drafted a similar statement. The president of the Association for Computing
Machinery called on the computer science community to make network hygiene a stan-
dard practice (6). A congressional bill introduced July 1988 by Wally Herger (R-Calif.)
and Robert Carr (D-Mich.), called the Computer Virus Eradication Act, will doubtless
reappear in the 101st Congress.
Obviously, all this interest is provoked by the massive scale of the worm's infesta-
tion and the queasy feeling that follows a close call. It also provides an opportunity to
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reviewkeyareasof specialconcernin networking. In what follows, I will comment on
vulnerabilities of open and closed networks, password protection, and responsible
behavior of network users.
The rich imagery of worms and viruses does not promote cool assessments of what
actually happened and of what the future might hold. It is interesting that as recently as
1982 worm programs were envisaged as helpful entities that located and used idle works-
tations for productive purposes (7); most people no longer make this benign interpreta-
tion. Some of the media reports have mistakenly called the invading program a virus
rather than a worm. A virus is a code segment that embeds itself inside a legitimate pro-
gram and is activated when that program is; it then embeds another copy of itself in
another legitimate but uninfected program, and it usually inflicts damage (8). Because
the virus is a more insidious attack, the mistaken use of terminology exaggerated the seri-
ousness of what happened. Given that the security weaknesses in the Internet service
programs have been repaired, it is unlikely that an attack against these specific
weaknesses could be launched again.
While it is important not to overestimate the seriousness of the attack, it is equally
important not to underestimate it. After all, the worm caused a massive disruption of ser-
vice.
It is important to aknowledge a widespread concern that grew out of this attack: Are
networks on which commerce, transportation, utilities, national defense, space flight, and
other critical activities depend also vulnerable? This concern arises from an awareness
of the extent to which the well-being of our society depends on the continued proper
functioning of vast networks that may be fragile. When considering this question, it is
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importantto bearin mindthat theIntemetis anopennetworkandtheothersareclosed.
Whatis therisk to anopennetwork? BecausetheIntemet is open by design, its
computers also contain extensive backup systems. Thus, in the worst case, if the worm
had destroyed all the files in all the computers it invaded, most users would have experi-
enced the loss of only a day's work. (This contrasts starkly to the threat facing most PC
users, who because of the lack of effective backup mechanisms stand to lose years of
work to a virus attack.) In addition, users would certainly lose access to their systems for
a day or more as the operations staff restored information from backups.
What are the implications for other networks? Computers containing proprietary
information or supporting critical operations are not generally connected to the Intemet;
the few exceptions are guarded by gateways that enforce strict access controls. For
example, the Defense Department's command and control network and NASA's space
shuttle network are designed for security and safety; it is virtually impossible for a virus
or worm to enter from the outside, and internal mechanisms would limit damage from a
virus or worm implanted from the inside. Given that the Intemet is designed for open-
ness, it is impossible to draw conclusions about closed networks from this incident.
Calls to restrict access to the Internet are ill-advised. The openness of the Intemet is
closely aligned with a deeply held value of the scientific community, the free exchange
of research findings. The great majority of scientists are willing to accept the risk that
their computers might be temporarily disabled by an attack, especially if a backup system
limits losses to a day's work.
The next area that calls for special concern is password security. Although trap-
doors and other weaknesses in Intemet protocols have been closed, password protection
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is a serious weakness that remains. (See Box 2.) The risk is compounded by "mutually
trusting hosts," a design in which a group of workstations is declared as a single system:
access to one constitutes access to all.
Many PC systems store passwords as unenciphered cleartext, or they do not use
passwords at all. When these systems become part of a set of trusting hosts, they are an
obvious security weakness. Fortunately, most systems do not store passwords as clear-
text. In UNIX, for example, the login procedure takes the user's password, enciphers it,
and compares the result with the user's enciphered entry in the password file. But one
can discover passwords from a limited set of candidates by enciphering each one and
comparing it with the password file until a match is found. One study of password files
revealed that anywhere from 8% to 30% of the passwords were the literal account name
or some simple variation; for example, an account named "abc" is likely to have the
password "abc", "bca", or "abcabc" (9). The worm program used a new version of
the password encryption algorithm that was nine times faster than the regular version in
UNIX; this allowed it to try many more passwords in a given time and increased its
chances of breaking into at least one account on a system. Having broken into an
account, the worm gained easy access to that computer's trusted neighbors.
The final area of special c0ncem is the responsibilities of people who participate in
a large networked community. Although some observers say that the worm was benign,
most say that the disruption of service and preemption of so many man-hours to analyze
the worm was a major national expense. Some observers have said that the worm was an
innocent experiment gone haywire, but the experts who analyzed the code dispute this,
saying that the many attack modes, the immortality of some worms, and the elaborate
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camouflage all indicate that the author intended the worm to propagate widely before it
was disabled. Most members of the computer science community agree that users must
accept responsibility for the possible wide-ranging effects of their actions and that users
do not have license to access idle computers without permission. They also believe that
the professional societies should take the lead in public education about the need for
responsible use of critical data now stored extensively in computers. Similarly, system
a&ninistrators have responsibilities to take steps that will minimize the risk of disruption:
they should not tolerate trapdoors, which permit access without authentication; they
should strengthen password authentication procedures to block guessed-password
attacks; they should isolate their backup systems from any Intemet connection; and they
should limit participation in mutually trusting groups.
Certainly the vivid imagery of worms and viruses has enabled many outsiders to
appreciate the subtlety and danger of attacks on computers attached to open networks. It
has increased public appreciation of the dependence of important segments of the econ-
omy, aerospace systems, and defense networks on computers and telecommunications.
Networks of computers have joined other critical networks that underpin our society --
water, gas, electricity, telephone, air traffic control, banking, to name a few. Just as we
have worked out ways to protect and ensure general respect for these other critical sys-
tems, we must work out ways to promote secure functioning networks of computers_ We
cannot separate technology from responsible use.
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How the worm worked
The Intemet worm of November 1988 was a program that invaded Sun 3 and VAX computers run-
ning versions of the Berkeley 4.3 UNIX operating system containing the TCP/IP Internet protocols. Its
sole purpose was to enter new machines by bypassing authentication procedures and to propagate new
copies of itself. It was prolific, generating on the order of hundreds of thousands of copies among several
thousand machines nationwide. It did not destroy information, give away passwords, or implant Trojan
horses for later damage.
A new worm began life by building a list of remote machines to attack. It made its selections from
the tables declaring which other machines are trusted by its current host, from users' mail-forwarding files,
from tables by which users give themselves permission for access to remote accounts, and from a program
that reports the status of network connections. For each of these potential new hosts, it attempted entry by
a variety of means: masquerading as a user by logging into an account after cracking its password; exploit-
ing a bug in the finger protocol, which reports the whereabouts of a remote user;, and exploiting a trapdoor
in the debug option of the remote process that receives and sends mail. In parallel with attacks on new
hosts, the worm undertook to guess the passwords of user accounts on its current host. It first tried the
account name and simple permutations of it, then a list of 432 built-in passwords, and finally all the words
from the local dictionary. An undetected worm could have spent many days at these password-cracking
attempts.
If any of its attacks on new hosts worked, the worm would find itself in communication with a
"shell" program -- a command interpreter -- on the remote machine. It fed that shell a 99 line bootstrap
program, together with commands to compile and execute it, then broke the connection. If that bootstrap
program started successfully, it would call back the parent worm within 120 seconds. The parent worm
copied over enciphered files containing the full worm code, which was compiled from a C program con-
taining about 3,000 lines. The parent worm then issued commands to construct a new worm from the enci-
phered pieces and start it.
The worm also made attempts at population control, looking for other worms in the same host and
negotiating with them which would terminate. However, a worm that agreed to terminate would first attack
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many ho_ts bcfor_ completing its part of _e bargain -- leaving the overall birthrate higher than the
death_ te. MoreQver, one Jn seven worms _clared itself immortal and entirely bypassed any paaicipation
in population control.
The worm's _authorwent to considerable pains to camouflage it. The main worm code was enci-
phered and sent to the remote host only when the bootstrap was known to be operating there as an accom-
plice. TI_ _w worm left no traces in the file system: it copied all its files into memory and deleted them
from a system's directories. The wo_ disabled the system function that produces "memory dumps" in
case of error, and it kept all character strings enciphered so that, in case a memory dump were obtained
anyway, it wo_d _ meaningless, The worm program gave itself _ n_¢ that made it appear as an innocu-
ous shell to the pro_ that lists processes b tJaesystem, and it frequently changed its process identifier.
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Protecting Passwords
The worm's dramatic demonstration of the weakness of most password systems should prompt a
thorough examination in the context of networks of computers. The following ate basic desiderata:
1. Every account should be protected by a password.
2. Passwords should be stored in an enciphered form, and the file containing the enciphered passwords
should not be publicly accessible (it is in UNIX).
3. Passwords should be deliberately chosen so that simple attacks cannot work -- for example, they
could include a punctuation mark and a numeral.
4. New passwords should be checked for security -- many systems have (friendly!) password checkers
that attempt to decipher passwords by systematic guessing, sending warning messages to users if
they axe successful.
5. To make extensive guessing expensive, the running time of the password encryption algorithm
should be made high, on the order of one second. This can be achieved by repeatedly enciphering
the password with a fast algorithm.
6. New cost-effective forms of user authentication should be employed, including devices to sense per-
sonal characteristics such as fingerprints, retinal patterns, or dynamic signatures, as well as magnetic
access cards.
7. Sets of computers that are mutually trusting in the sense that login to one constitutes login to all need
to be carefully controlled. No computer outside the declared set should have unauthenticated access,
and no computer inside should grant access to an outside computer.

